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Extended Abstract  
The demand for emancipation was once something we only associated with oppressed social groups 
such  as  Women,  Workers  or  the  colonized  who  were  seeking  to  escape  from  various  forms  of 
domination which they had long been subjected to. Today, some of the most privileged groups in our 
society such as middle managers and professions talk about their thirst for emancipation. They seek 
this precious and awe inspiring goal through participating in management courses (Gosling, 2000), 
reading  various  forms  of  management  literature  which  promises  to  turn  them  into  revolutionaries 
(Jacques, 1996), and engaging with various journeys to free themselves from the shackles of thought 
control and simply ‘be themselves’ at work (Fleming, 2009). Corporations routinely sell themselves as a 
route to emancipation for their consumers and employees. One only needs to think about the recent 
advertisement for Virgin which replaced the famous images of the revolutionary Ché Guevara with 
Richard Branson. The message seems to be clear – it is not just radical political movements that can 
provide emancipation, corporations can too! 
The  fact  that  emancipation  has  lost  its  anchor  in  radical  political  movements  and  shocks  and 
scandalizes some. For others, it is a kind of an indication of how endlessly flexible and omnivorous 
capitalism is insofar as it is able to adopt nearly anything – include forms of virulent anti-capitalism – to 
further  itself.  While  these  two  explanations  are  certainly  appealing,  we  think  that  the  widespread 
adoption of this culture of emancipation actually underlines the increasing uncertainty and fragmentation 
that  has  taken  place  around  the  term.  For  us  this  is  due  to  a  shift  in  focus  of  understanding  of 
emancipation.  Previously,  emancipation  was  understood  as  a  form  of  wide-scale  transformational 
change in society achieved through intellectuals enlightening people who find themselves dominated.  
This  notion  informed  studies  of  emancipation  for  many  years.  The  result  was  that  research  on 
emancipation  tended  to  focus  on  either  documenting  large  scale  challenges  to  capitalism  and 
management or agitating for emancipation through a progressive enlightenment of the audience. This 
approach to emancipation began to fall out of favour as it was accused of being too grandiose - subjects 
were positioned as victims of managerial knowledge which they could only escape from through the 
progressive  enlightenment  under  the  tutelage  of  critical  intellectuals.  Such  disenchantment  led 
researchers  to  turn  their  focus  towards  more  minor  forms  of  micro-emancipation  whereby  people 
momentarily escape from domination in their everyday life through minor activities (eg. Alvesson and 
Willmott, 1992). This focus produced a deep body of literature that documented the various ways 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1 The three authors contributed equally to this article and are listed alphabetically.  	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
individuals seek out micro-emancipation in the workplace (eg. Zanoni and Jensens, 2007). However, 
recently we have witnessed some important questions being asked around this research agenda. In 
particular, some are concerned that it has begun to fundamentally constrain how we think about forms 
of emancipation, creating a myopic focus on small-scale struggles and fundamentally ignoring many of 
the broader social struggles that challenge management.  
In  this  paper  we  seek  to  overcome  these  problems  associated  with  macro  as  well  as  micro-
emancipation by positing a new conception of emancipation offered in the recent thought of Jacques 
Rancière. For Rancière, emancipation should not be seen as an ideal to be reached, but as a postulate 
to be acualised in day-to-day practice. He points out that equality can be actualized by interrupting the 
order of sensibility (rather than through quotidian everyday acts), through creating a sense of dissensus 
(rather than collaboration and attempts to create consensus), and attempts to singularize the universal 
(rather than through fragmentary struggles). By focusing on these three processes, Rancière enables us 
to  see  a  range  of  emancipatory  struggles  that  we  were  blinded  to  by  both  accounts  of  marco-
emancipation (which went looking for grand revolts) as well as micro-emancipation (which focused on 
everyday transgression). In particular it enables us to register the kinds of emancipation movements 
that have frequently been left out of accounts of emancipation in organization studies. These include the 
self-education movements, proliterian intellectual movements, as well as forms art.  
Rancière’s account of emancipation allows us to extend how we think about processes of emancipation 
in and around organizations in three ways. First, it allows us to register activities in our theoretical gaze 
that we had previously ignored or discounted. Macro-emancipation focuses our attention on collective 
movements  which  are  organised  and  micro-emancipation  focuses  our  attention  on  often  individual 
every-day activities which are not organised.  In contrast, Rancière draws our attention to various 
emancipatory movements that are often collective, but are not formally organised. This broadens the 
range of forms of emancipation we can study. Second, Rancière allows us to rethink how exactly 
emancipation works. Instead of focusing on creation of new states of freedom (as studies of macro 
emancipation do) or attempts to seize fleeting forms of freedom (as studies of micro emanciption do), 
Rancière’s work allows us to see how emancipation involves the transformation of the sensible. This re-
orients our studies to how emancipation movements seek to change what and how we actually see the 
world. Finally, Rancière allows us to move beyond the assumption that contemporary resistance is 
fragmented and disorganised by registering how individual forms of resistance are experienced as an 
embodiment or singularization of universal struggles. Doing this allows us to recognise the link between 
the  specific  demands  of  many  resistance  movements  and  more  universal  claims  such  as  dignity, 
recognition, and justice. By making these three contributions, we hope to move beyond either an elitist 
account found in studies of macro-emancipation and the banal account found in studies of micro-
emancaiption.  
In order to make this argument, we proceed as follows. We begin by reviewing the two dominant 
conceptions of emancipation. First we look at three different modes of emancipation that have been 
successively pursued – political emancipation, economic emancipation and ideological emancipation. 
We then look at the ways in which organization studies has suggested these struggles take place – 
through ‘macro-emancipation’ or ‘micro-emancipation’. In this review we highlight the shortcomings of 
these two existing conceptions of emancipation. We then introduce a third conception of emancipation 
inspired by the work of Jacques Rancière. After we have outlined this, we then draw out the implications 
of this for the study of emancipation in organization studies. We conclude by sketching out what new 
areas of emancipation this allows us to understand and perhaps engage with.  
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Introduction 
 
The demand for emancipation was once something we only associated with oppressed social groups 
such  as  Women,  Workers  or  the  colonized  who  were  seeking  to  escape  from  various  forms  of 
domination which they had long been subjected to. Today, some of the most privileged groups in our 
society such as middle managers and professions talk about their thirst for emancipation. They seek 
this precious and awe-inspiring goal through participating in management courses (Gosling, 2000), 
reading  various  forms  of  management  literature  which  promises  to  turn  them  into  revolutionaries 
(Jacques, 1996), and engaging with various journeys to free themselves from the shackles of thought 
control and simply ‘be themselves’ at work (Fleming, 2009). Corporations routinely sell themselves as a 
route to emancipation for their consumers and employees. One only needs to think about the recent 
advertisement for Virgin which replaced the famous images of the revolutionary Ché Guevara with 
Richard Branson. The message seems to be clear – it is not just radical political movements that can 
provide emancipation, corporations can too! 
The fact that emancipation has lost its anchor in radical political movements and now appears to be a 
kind of polyvalent term is certainly something that shocks and scandalizes some. For others, it is a kind 
of indication of how endlessly flexible and omnivorous capitalism is insofar as it is able to adopt nearly 
anything – including forms of virulent anti-capitalism – to further itself (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). 
While these two explanations are certainly appealing, we think that the widespread adoption of this 
culture of emancipation actually underlines the increasing uncertainty and fragmentation that has taken 
place  around  the  term.  For  us,  this  is  due  to  a  shift  in  focus  of  understanding  of  emancipation. 
Previously, emancipation was understood as a form of wide-scale transformational change in society 
achieved through intellectuals enlightening people who find themselves dominated. This notion informed 
studies of emancipation for many years. The result was that research on emancipation tended to focus 
on  either  documenting  large-scale  challenges  to  capitalism  and  management  or  agitating  for 
emancipation through a progressive enlightenment of the audience. This approach to emancipation 
began to fall out of favour as it was accused of being too grandiose - subjects were positioned as 
victims of managerial knowledge which they could only escape from through progressive enlightenment 
under the tutelage of critical intellectuals. Such disenchantment led researchers to turn their focus 
towards more minor forms of micro-emancipation whereby people momentarily escape from domination 
in their everyday life through minor activities (e.g. Alvesson and Willmott, 1992). This focus produced a 
deep body of literature that documented the various ways individuals seek out micro-emancipation in 
the workplace (e.g. Zanoni and Janssens, 2007). However, recently we have witnessed some important 
questions being asked around this research agenda. In particular, some are concerned that it has 
begun to fundamentally constrain how we think about forms of emancipation, creating a myopic focus 
on small-scale struggles and fundamentally ignoring many of the broader social struggles that challenge 
management.  
In  this  paper,  we  seek  to  overcome  these  problems  associated  with  macro  as  well  as  micro-
emancipation by positing a new conception of emancipation offered in the recent thought of Jacques 
Rancière. For Rancière, emancipation should not be seen as an ideal to be reached, but as a postulate 
to be actualised in day-to-day practice. He points out that equality can be actualized by interrupting the 
order of sensibility (rather than through everyday acts), through creating a sense of dissensus (rather 
than collaboration and attempts to create consensus), and attempts to singularize the universal (rather 
than through fragmentary struggles). By focusing on these three processes, Rancière enables us to see 
a range of emancipatory struggles that we were blinded to by both accounts of macro-emancipation 
(which went looking for grand revolts) as well as micro-emancipation (which focused on everyday 
transgression). In particular it enables us to register the kinds of emancipation movements that have 	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frequently been left out of accounts of emancipation in organization studies. These include the self-
education movements, proletarian intellectual movements, as well as forms of art.  
Rancière’s account of emancipation allows us to extend how we think about processes of emancipation 
in and around organizations in three ways. First, it allows us to register activities in our theoretical gaze 
that we had previously ignored or discounted. Macro-emancipation focuses our attention on collective 
movements  which  are  organised  and  micro-emancipation  focuses  our  attention  on  often  individual 
every-day activities which are not organised.  In contrast, Rancière draws our attention to various 
emancipatory movements that are often collective, but are not formally organised. This broadens the 
range of forms of emancipation we can study. Second, Rancière allows us to rethink how exactly 
emancipation works. Instead of focusing on creation of new states of freedom (as studies of macro 
emancipation do) or attempts to seize fleeting forms of freedom (as studies of micro emancipation do), 
Rancière’s work allows us to see how emancipation involves the transformation of the sensible. This re-
orients our studies to how emancipation movements seek to change what and how we actually see the 
world. Finally, Rancière allows us to move beyond the assumption that contemporary resistance is 
fragmented and disorganised by registering how individual forms of resistance are experienced as an 
embodiment or singularization of universal struggles. Doing this allows us to recognise the link between 
the specific demands of many resistance movements and the more universal demands of equality. By 
making these three contributions, we hope to move beyond both an elitist account found in studies of 
macro-emancipation and the banal account found in studies of micro-emancipation.  
In order to make this argument, we proceed as follows. We begin by reviewing the two dominant 
conceptions of emancipation. First we look at three different modes of emancipation that have been 
successively pursued – political emancipation, economic emancipation and ideological emancipation. 
We then look at the ways in which organization studies have suggested these struggles take place – 
through ‘macro-emancipation’ or ‘micro-emancipation’. In this review we highlight the shortcomings of 
these two existing conceptions of emancipation. We then introduce a third conception of emancipation 
inspired by the work of Jacques Rancière. After we have outlined this, we then draw out its implications 
for the study of emancipation in organization studies. We conclude by sketching out what new areas of 
emancipation this allows us to understand and perhaps engage with.  
 
 
1- Emancipation in Organization Studies 
 
 
1.1 The concept of emancipation 
Emancipation is the ‘process through which individuals and groups become freed from repressive social 
and ideological conditions, in particular those that place socially unnecessary restrictions upon the 
development and articulation of human consciousness’ (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992: 432). Although it 
is difficult to find the concept in the index of most management texts, emancipation is an important 
phenomenon in organizations. In the introduction we noted that emancipation appears to be central to 
much new wave management discourse which places inordinate emphasis on self-discovery, freedom, 
and rebellion (Fleming, 2009). But emancipation goes beyond management talk. It has proved to be an 
important theme which has driven many struggles which are a central part of organizational life ranging 
from highly individualized forms of rebellion through to far more pronounced collective movements (e.g. 
Zanoni and Janssens, 2007). Further more, the experience of emancipation is one that many studies 
have widely reported as something which many employees seek and indeed sometimes find in the 
workplace. Finally, emancipation has appeared again and again as a important normative demand 
which  intellectuals  demand  to  put  into  practice  through  their  research,  teaching  and  public 	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engagements. Put together this suggests that emancipation is not some kind of diversionary question 
designed to entertain tenured rebels, but is actually a central aspect of understanding organizational life.  
In order to begin to acknowledge the importance of the concept of emancipation in what follows, we will 
trace the development of the concept of emancipation and relate it to work life. We will argue that there 
are three dominant conceptions of emancipation – political emancipation which is achieved through 
gaining  rights  of  a  citizen,  economic  emancipation  which  is  achieved  through  gaining  control  of 
economic  processes  in  society,  and  ideological  emancipation  which  involves  gaining  control  of 
processes of culture and subjectivation. Let us briefly look at each of these modes of emancipation. 
 
Political Emancipation 
Although the concept of emancipation is fairly new to management theory, it has deep intellectual and 
historical roots that can be traced back to at least the Enlightenment. As is well known, one of the 
central  axioms  of  the  Enlightenment  involved  the  systematic  application  of  reason  not  only  to  our 
explanations of the social world, but also to the design of social institutions. Central to this was the 
‘unveiling’ of the various irrationalities and problematic assumptions which lay behind institutions as 
wide-ranging as systems of government, relationships between ‘races’, international relations, gender 
relations, various forms of culture and work-relations. The systematic application of reason in each of 
these spheres typically unveiled what had long been considered to be collective irrationalities in how we 
organize and co-ordinate these institutions. The result was wave after wave of ongoing critiques and 
attempts to over-throw many of these ‘irrational’ institutions that had long dominated our collective social 
life. Some examples included the emancipation of subjects from the rule of monarchy such as the 
French Revolution, the emancipation of peasants from forms of Feudal bondage to their landlords, the 
emancipation of slaves from their masters such as Abraham Lincoln’s ‘Emancipation Proclamation’, the 
emancipation of workers from dominated working conditions imposed on them, the emancipation of 
various subject peoples from their colonial oppressors which was associated with various forms of 
nationalism and anti-colonialism in the ‘developing world’, the emancipation of women from forms of 
masculine oppression, and the emancipation of Gay and Lesbian people from the demands associated 
with a hetero-normative society. In each of these widely varying cases, we notice a consistent theme: 
emancipation appears to involve the application of reason to social relations which were previously 
justified  through  appeals  to  tradition,  the  recognition  that  these  social  relations  involve  a  form  of 
domination,  and  the  attempt  to  overthrow  these  forms  of  domination  and  replace  them  with  more 
reasoned forms of social relationships. What is crucial here is the attempt to escape from relations of 
domination through the free use of reason.      
While the call for emancipation appeared to be a common strand among many struggles inspired by the 
Enlightenment,  there  often  appeared  to  very  different  dynamics  associated  with  this  process  of 
emancipation. These dynamics involved people becoming free in one sphere of social life yet remaining 
dominated in another sphere of social life. This was a particular concern for Karl Marx. In his review 
essay ‘On The Jewish Question’, he examines one particular emancipation – the debate about the 
formal emancipation of Jewish people in Europe from forms of oppression through the formal granting of 
political rights. This was widely celebrated as an important potential emancipation for a people who had 
previously been bereft of many of the basic human rights that citizens enjoyed. However, Marx pointed 
out that while this Emancipation was largely formal, it did not involve a complete application of reasoned 
reflection on all aspects of life. In particular, emancipation was only a form of ‘political emancipation’ 
whereby the Jewish people were freed from the various political restrictions which had been previously 
imposed on them relating to the fact that they were not considered equal citizens of the state. However, 
this was a limited form of emancipation that did not completely emancipate Jews from all the modes of 
restriction that they faced. Indeed, he points out that these forms of restrictions are internal to religion 
itself (something which is to be practiced in Civil Society after political emancipation). This leads him to 	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offer a broader concept of ‘human emancipation’ which involves an attempt to extend the lessons and 
experiences  of  human  emancipation  into  broader  aspects  of  life  and  overcome  the  split  between 
political emancipation and emancipation experienced in civil society. This is how Marx describes this 
broader ‘human emancipation’:   
“Every emancipation is a restoration of the human world and of human relationships to man 
himself. Human emancipation will only be complete when the real individual man has absorbed 
into himself the abstract citizen; when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and 
in  his  relationships,  he  has  become  a  species-being;  and  when  he  has  recognized  and 
organized his own powers [forces propres] as social powers so that he no longer separates his 
social power from himself as political power.” (Marx/Engels 1956, 1, p.370, Marx/Engels 1978, 
p.46) 
In this dense and rather abstract paragraph, Marx suggests that Human Emancipation involves the 
radical extension of the lessons and achievements of political liberation to all aspects of civil society 
including everyday life, work and personal relations. One way of formulating this is that it involves an 
attempt to liberate oneself from the various forms of unreasonable domination that are created in civil 
society. Indeed, Marx would claim that the only way this is possible is through emancipation from the 
concept of civil society as such.  
 
Economic Emancipation 
Marx’s encouragement to examine forms of emancipation in (and indeed beyond) civil society gave birth 
to a whole tradition of political-economic theory, which examined the various possibilities for a more 
extended conception of emancipation. Perhaps the best known of these claims came in the form of 
claims that emancipation in the economic sphere was one of the central ways in which a more complete 
form of emancipation could be achieved. Indeed, in the second part of Marx’s essay on the matter, he 
highlighted the importance of such economic emancipation, and in particular underlined how one of the 
central problems with political emancipation is that it actually tightens the control of the economic 
sphere and what we would now call economic logic. Such an emphasis led theorists of emancipation to 
emphasise emancipation from capitalist economic relationships, and in particular dynamics associated 
with class (Olin-Wright, 1993). It pointed theorists towards a range of emancipations that might be 
achieved by the working classes. Initially the focus for many nineteenth-century labour activists was 
facilitating emancipation from the derogatory material conditions which were suffered by the working 
class. This led to a range of struggles for the reduction of working time (the eight-hour day movement), 
the improvement of pay, the improvement of basic workplace conditions (such as claims for safety), as 
well  as  struggles  for  general  improvements  in  working  class  life  (through  model  towns  and  the 
foundation  of  various  workers’  institutes  and  clubs).  A  second  focus  became  attempts  not  just  to 
improve life, but also to emancipate workers from the capitalist ownership of the means of production. 
This struggle came in many forms which ranged from large-scale revolutions (such as the Communist 
Revolutions), attempts to found worker-owned organizations (such as the Co-Operative movement), 
and attempts to socialize the ownership of some industries (such as the socialization of industries in 
Europe in the second part of the twentieth Century).  A third focus involved an attempt to emancipate 
workers  within  the  workplace  from  capitalist  (and  increasingly  managerial)  control  over  the  labour 
process. This involves a whole range of experiments with forms of more participative forms of control 
over the workplace and, in some cases, an active attempt to escape from capitalist work relationships. 
These  claims  share  a  common  concern  with  seeking  to  liberate  employees  from  the  demands 
associated with capitalist economic necessity.  
 
Ideological Emancipation 	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It is obvious that many of the demands for economic emancipation have by no means been universally 
met. This is particularly striking if we look outside of the core of the economy in Western countries. 
However, some commentators in the 1960s and 1970s claimed that the working class had experienced, 
at least to an extent, some kind of economic emancipation. This had resulted in rising living standards, 
greater ownership of capitalist industry, and increasing influence on the organization of the labour 
process. Yet, at the same time, commentators claimed that these same people had become more, 
rather than less, dominated (e.g. Marcuse, 1964). The broad culture and life world in which they lived 
had become increasingly dominated by contemporary forms of ideological control that relied upon mass 
media and the manipulation of culture. The central problem became increasingly seen as escape not 
just from the lack of political rights or material depravation, but from the domination of one’s sense of 
self through a whole slew of ideological mechanisms that were seen as restricting self-exploration and 
reflection.  This  entailed  the  manufacture  of  false  needs,  distorted  patterns  of  communication,  and 
warped understandings of oneself. In society more generally, this was largely seen to be facilitated by 
mass media that perpetuated false images of society. Within the workplace, this is manifest through the 
dominance  of  technocratic  ideology  associated  with  managerialism  (Alvesson,  1987),  but  also 
increasingly through the dominance of corporate cultures which manipulated the employee’s sense of 
self (Willmott, 1993). Indeed, many of these new forms of managerial manipulation of culture often 
positioned themselves as a form of emancipation because they would offer employees the opportunity 
for self-exploration and self-development (Fleming, 2009). In other words, contemporary cultures of 
work  actually  seek  to  offer  employees  emancipation  rather  than  being  something  that  they  seek 
emancipation from.   
 
1.2 Modes of Emancipation 
The paradox of workplace cultures that offer employees emancipation has set up a strange puzzle for 
organization theorists, in particular those who champion emancipation. It poses the question of whether 
we have finally arrived at a situation in some workplaces, through years of struggle, where some 
employees have finally found the emancipation that they have been seeking. While some might enjoy 
this prospect, others have questioned whether these cultures of emancipation are actually genuine. For 
instance, Alvesson and Willmott (1992) point out that “much modern management theory is concerned 
with freeing employees from unnecessarily alienating forms of work organization” (p.433). Although they 
see these softer forms of humanistic management as an important step towards a genuine process of 
emancipation, they question whether it actually offers genuine possibilities of emancipation. For them, 
such attempts to emancipate the workforce are “based upon a narrow and mystifying understanding of 
key  prerequisites  of  emancipation.  Such  an  approach  mobilizes  a  discourse  .  .  .  of  (bourgeois) 
humanism in which the emancipation of individuals is identified with the provision of opportunities for the 
fulfilment of their needs” (p.433). In particular, they are suspicious of forms of emancipation whereby 
managers seek to emancipate employees through strategic change efforts. Indeed, “emancipation is not 
a gift bestowed upon employees; rather it necessitates the (often painful) resistance to, and overcoming 
of, socially unnecessary restrictions” (p.433). They therefore suggest that it is important to go beyond 
various forms of managerially imposed emancipation in order to offer a more genuine and sincere 
experience. In order to do this, researchers drawing on critical management studies have put forward 
two possible modes of emancipation – macro-emancipation and micro emancipation. Let use look at 
each of these forms of emancipation in some more depth as well as considering their shortcomings. 
 
Macro-Emancipation 
In order to affect genuine emancipation, many have turned to ideas about emancipation that can be 
found in the tradition of Critical Theory. At the heart of this work, at least as it has been received in 
Critical Management Studies, is a demand for the radical transformation of not only the workplace, but 	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society more generally (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992: 435-438).  This is premised on the assumption 
that critical social science should fundamentally contribute to liberating people from various forms of 
oppression and limitations that distort patterns of communication and construct a series of false needs 
within people as well as create questionable relationships between people. To achieve this, critical 
theory seeks to increase the capacity to both individually and collectives to reflect critically on not only 
the broad structures of society in which we live, but also how ideological structures have shaped and 
constrained our sense of self in various repressive ways. In the context of management this involves a 
through-going critique of technocratic reason associated with managerialism (e.g. Alvesson, 1987). 
Seeking to challenge such changes through incremental modifications to existing social structures is 
thought to be a questionable, if not illusory approach. This is because, at best, such piecemeal changes 
do not adequately challenge processes of domination that are deeply rooted in existing structures. At 
worst, such piecemeal changes are seen as a kind of alibi which can be used by the powerful to provide 
immediate  satisfaction  to  the  demands  of  the  oppressed  without  actually  transforming  the  most 
important underlying causes of oppression. Therefore, the only possible route to emancipation involves 
a radical challenge to existing social structures and ideological co-ordinates. Earlier accounts of this 
radical challenge point out it means fundamentally questioning dominate obsessions with the profit 
motive, constant growth, and the dominance of technocratic reason in organizations (e.g. Benson, 
1977). Others pointed out that a fundamental reform and reworking on the broad social structure (such 
as  hierarchical  relations  and  the  international  division  of  labour)  is  an  essential  part  of  creating 
meaningful  emancipation.  More  recent  accounts  have  re-introduced  many  of  these  concerns  by 
claiming that instead of indulging in minor acts of resistance, employees need to engage in more far-
reaching forms of resistance which create real and meaningful breaks in their own experiences and 
commitments in organizational life (Contu, 2008). This involves a fundamental change in the social-
symbolic co-ordinates associated with the organization. What is common to each of these approaches 
is that emancipation is understood to involve a radical break whereby the entire socio-symbolic structure 
is fundamentally changed. This change is thought to be facilitated by intellectuals encouraging critical 
self-reflection which would allow people to see the conditions of oppression which they suffer. They 
would then seek to change these through processes of individual change as well as collective action.   
While this vision of emancipation certainly sounds appealing, it has been the subject of criticism. It has 
been called into question by Alvesson and Willmott (1992) for three reasons. First, they point out that 
grand approaches to emancipation have adopted an overly intellectual approach that assumes the 
unfettered  use  of  human  reason  will  result  in  opportunities  for  critical  thinking  and  thus  create 
widespread emancipation. They point out that this is not necessarily the case because many forms of 
domination are not just sustained through reason, but actually involve a bodily and emotional hold over 
people. Therefore, seeking to intellectually challenge a structure may do little more than create a kind of 
cynical distance from it that actually ends up sustaining it in practice (Fleming and Spicer, 2003). The 
second  problem  with  grand  conceptions  of  emancipation  is  that  they  often  seek  to  totalize  a 
phenomenon so it is treated as a coherent whole without attending to many of the ambiguities and 
contradictions that are often associated with such structures. The result is that a social structure that we 
seek emancipation from is treated as being highly integrated and solid, even when it may not be 
(Latour, 2004; Spicer et al, 2009).  The final problem with grand conceptions of emancipation is that 
they can be overly negative. This means that they can utterly dismiss many of the important and 
relevant  advances  associated  with  management.  It  can  also  make  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible  for 
proponents of critical theory to reach out to wider social groups who might be attracted by potentially 
more hopeful and engaging visions. Indeed, the negativism presented by grand forms of critical theory 
can result in a kind of cynical resignation rather than inspiring the necessary hope which is required for 
emancipatory change (Spicer et al, 2009). Taken together, these charges of intellectualism, totalization 
and negativism have led many to be profoundly suspicious of the potential and possibilities associated 
with grand visions of emancipation. 	 ﾠ 9	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Micro-Emancipation 
In order to deal with the shortcomings associated with macro-emancipation, others have sought to 
develop  more  limited  and  circumspect  understandings  of  emancipation  in  organization  and 
management  studies.  Perhaps  this  is  best  captured  in  Alvesson  and  Willmott’s  concept  of  ‘micro-
emancipation’. Broadly, this involves not an attempt to radically change the entire structure of society, 
but a more narrow and focused search for ‘loopholes’ in current forms of managerial control that can 
provide temporary forms of emancipation. Engaging in such an activity involves focusing on ‘concrete 
activities, forms, and techniques that offer themselves not only as means of control, but also as objects 
and facilitators of resistance and, thus, as vehicles for liberation. In this formulation, processes of 
emancipation are understood to be uncertain, contradictory, ambiguous, and precarious’ (p.446). It does 
not involve attending to the kind of unidirectional account of progressive liberation facilitated through the 
critical insights of intellectuals. Rather, it requires close attention to the various forms of everyday 
emancipation which people mobilize to challenge various forms of managerial domination. This call has 
led to three important shifts in how these forms of emancipation are studied. The first entails attempts to 
re-orient methods of research away from a process of intellectual enlightenment through distanced 
critical  thinking  towards  a  much  more  engaged  form  of  research  which  involves  close  listening  to 
research subjects in order to understand their own life world, more creative and engaged forms of 
writing, and seeking out emancipatory elements in apparently mainstream texts (Alvesson and Willmott, 
1992: 453-460). While these elements have certainly been taken up in many critical studies during the 
last  two  decades,  perhaps  a  more  important  aspect  of  calls  to  engage  in  the  study  of  micro-
emancipation has involved attempts to investigate and unveil all the forms of micro-emancipation which 
occur everyday in workplaces. One example is a study of how immigrant employees in Belgium sought 
minor  loopholes  in  the  managerially  imposed  employment  practices  (Zanoni  and  Janssens,  2007). 
These included changing working schedules or even using some aspects of management as a way of 
escaping from forms of domination that they felt marked their lives. This is just one study in what has 
now  become  a  lengthy  catalogue  of  various  processes  of  employee  micro-emancipation  through 
practices as varied as day-dreaming, developing cynical counter-cultures, engaging in private activities 
in the workplace such as sexuality and sleeping, and strategically opposing managers on particular 
issues (for review, see: Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Fleming, 2005; Spicer and Böhm, 2007).  In 
sum, the call to investigate micro-emancipation has involved a widespread attempt to examine and 
engage various minor forms of resistance in organizations.    
The study of micro-emancipation has certainly provided an important and notable break in how we 
understand the pursuit of emancipation in organizations. In many ways it has brought us closer to 
understandings  and  experiences  of  people’s  lived  experiences  of  emancipation  in  their  everyday 
working lives. However, in recent years there has been an increasing number of questions about the 
usefulness of the term and the kind of research trajectory it has established for critical management 
studies.  
The first of these critiques addresses the issue of banality. By this we mean micro-emancipation tends 
to train the attention of researchers onto increasingly minor and insignificant acts of resistance. Indeed, 
Alessia  Contu  (2008)  mockingly  refers  to  this  as  researchers  seeking  to  find  radical  intent  in  the 
flatulence of employees. If we examine the foci of many of these studies, they tend to be issues which 
occur as part of the everyday life of the organization and many give employees a psychological sense 
that  they  are  being  rebellious  and  seriously  questioning  the  structure  or  practical  functions  of 
organizations. This examination of increasingly banal activities has the result of shifting researchers’ 
attention  and  interest  from  important  collective  struggles  which  seek  to  institute  more  meaningful 
collective change towards highly transient and individualized forms of resistance that may have little 
impact on creating a meaningful sense of emancipation – aside from momentary individual hedonic 
pleasure which might come from breaking the rules.    	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The second problem that is increasingly recognized with modes of micro-emancipation is that they may 
actually prove to be a form of collaboration. By this we mean that these forms might not actually lead to 
meaningful emancipation, but create the conditions which actually firm up relations of domination. This 
might be so in two ways. First, various forms of micro-emancipation could actually act as a kind of 
‘safety-valve’ which discharges the pressure built up in an organization as employees routinely face 
forms of domination. This pressure is discharged through a variety of minor actors that do not have a 
profound impact on the daily functioning of organizational life. This means that by creating some space 
for various forms of micro-emancipation, organizations are actually able to ensure the relatively smooth 
functioning of the overall system.  Another way that forms of micro-emancipation may bolster existing 
forms of resistance and struggle is by acting as a kind of creative laboratory which actually gives rise to 
new  forms  of  social  organization  and  innovation  which  can  subsequently  be  incorporated  by  the 
dominant groups in an organization. One recent example of this argument can be found in Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s (2005) study of the rise of new wave management in France. They argued that the demands 
for authenticity and creativity associated with new wave management were actually created by many of 
the post-1968 social movements who actively set out to challenge management. They point out how 
resistance to the bureaucratic forms of management which dominated 1960s France actually created 
the cultures of flexibility and change which we see in contemporary managerialism. A similar point can 
be found in a range of studies of resistance to change which point out that various forms of minor 
struggles within organizations do not need to be opposed by management but actually embraced (e.g. 
Ford et al, 2007). This is because embracing resistance will help management not only to deal with 
troublesome dissent, but also to learn from the potential innovations which these dissenting groups may 
have created.  
The third problem associated with a focus on micro-emancipation is that it may lead to a fragmented 
understanding. By this we mean that by only focusing on a multiplicity of relatively minor forms of social 
change, we may begin to treat these struggles as entirely separated and local, thereby beginning to lose 
sight of the more profound and far-reaching dynamics which actually underlie or indeed connect such 
struggles.  Perhaps  the  most  important  danger  here  is  that  by  looking  at  these  multiple  different 
struggles, the researcher simply records a whole series of different social struggles. This may blind 
them to any common claims which each of these struggles might have. It could also blind researchers to 
actually offering any meaningful account of potential common causes or historical processes associated 
with various struggles for micro-emancipation. Finally, it may lead researchers to make the mistake of 
not  looking  at  the  actual,  or  indeed  potential  connections  that  could  exist  between  these  different 
struggles. This would involve a kind of blindness to what some have called the ‘chains of equivalence’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Willmott, 2005; Spicer and Böhm, 2007) that actually connect these different 
struggles. This might mean missing out on potentially powerful forms of more collective and connected 
modes  of  emancipation  of  which  different  aspects  of  micro-emancipation  may  only  be  one 
manifestation. Indeed this could lead to a situation which is the opposite of that described by Fleming 
and Sewell (2002) whereby instead of ignoring micro forms of struggle because we only train out 
interest on large scale struggles, we actually miss accounting for the more collective forms of struggle 
against managerialism because we are so focused on detailing the minutiae of micro-emancipations in 
particular localities (Ganesh et al, 2005). The result is that the researcher develops a kind of myopic 
obsession with differences and locality without considering any important patterns of similarities. 
The final potential problem with a focus on micro-emancipation is that it could give rise to a kind of latent 
conservatism. That is, by training our focus on only small-scale struggles we might begin only to include 
in  our  accounts  and  indeed  vision  of  emancipation  those  struggles  which  have  not  fundamentally 
threatened  existing  structures  of  power  and  domination.  By  this  we  mean  only  examining  minor 
struggles might lead to our not looking for larger-scale social struggles and including them in our 
account of emancipation. This would have the implications of not only creating a deprived and relatively 
empty notion of emancipation. It would also mean that the only forms of resistance that we actually see 	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are those that have the most limited scope and ambition. The result could be that much of the radical 
tenor found in the concept of emancipation could be effectively emptied out. All that would be left is 
simply a collection of tactical manoeuvres. What would be left out is a whole history of utopian and 
wide-ranging  visions  of  emancipation  that  have  been  an  important  part  of  many  emancipation 
movements (no matter how deluded). By removing this, we would be effectively providing an emaciated 
empirical account of emancipation. What is more, we would be emptying the notion of emancipation of 




2 - A Rancièrian Reading of Emancipation 
 
 
Our goal here is to help elucidate the issue of emancipation in Critical Management Studies (CMS) 
through our understanding of the thinking of the philosopher Jacques Rancière. Rancière’s posture 
does not provide us with ready-made solutions to the questions raised in debate on emancipation within 
CMS. Even so, it does offer fertile ground, in our view, for shifting and reframing a number of the 
aforementioned problematics by enabling us to reformulate difficulties faced in drawing up the critical 
agenda using the terms laid out in this philosophy. By radically redefining what politics is and by 
outlining the contours of democracy with notable acuity, Rancière’s work can redirect our thinking on 
emancipation.  
 
For  instance,  several  scholars  (e.g.  Brooke,  2002)  see  in  ‘the  emancipatory  intention’  of  critical 
management theory a focus on the emancipatory process rather than on its outcome. Emancipation is 
understood as an ideal to reach, always situated in the future and always subject to the uncertainty of 
outcomes. In Brooke’s view (2002), this process-oriented conception of emancipation, which primarily 
emphasises the pre-requisites for its enactment, explains the position of eminence granted to the works 
of Habermas in the field of critical management theories. Ascribing to this theoretical stream, most 
works in CMS accordingly think of emancipation through the concepts of the regulatory properties of 
dialogue between equals, participation, and the search for consensus. These alone are deemed likely to 
set the necessary pre-conditions for enacting the emancipatory intention to establish a democratic 
egalitarian society.  
Rancière’s radical philosophy stands in stark contrast to this conception of emancipation on three 
points. First of all, in Rancière’s thinking, equality is not an ideal to reach but a principle to actualise. 
From this postulate it follows that emancipation does not pertain to whatever allows us to reach this 
ideal of equality, but rather, to a set of practices guided by the presupposition of the equality of anyone 
and by a relentless drive to verify it. Secondly, the guiding principle on which emancipatory practices 
rest is not the idea of consensus but Rancière’s idea of dissensus and conflict. Politics (i.e. democracy, 
for  Rancière)  is  not  a  set  of  processes  whereby  collective  groups  aggregate  opinions  and  reach 
consensus. Instead, for Rancière, politics arises from the realm of the police, as do the processes 
governing the organisation of powers, the distribution of places and functions, and the systems that 
legitimise this distribution. Politics, and therefore the practice of emancipation, takes place whenever 
dissensus is expressed, meaning confrontation between police logic and egalitarian logic (Rancière, 
1995).  Lastly,  emancipation  is  the  disruption  and  the  interruption  of  the  ordering  seen  as  flowing 
naturally from the share of the sensible between the dominant and the dominated; it is the claim to 





Born in Algiers in 1940, Jacques Rancière, Emeritus Professor at Université Paris VIII, is one of the best-known 
French philosophers of his generation. A disciple of Louis Althusser, he contributed to the latter’s writing of the 
work Lire le capital, before publicly breaking away from his former master in May 1968. Subsequently in 1974, he 
wrote La leçon d’Althusser in which he explicitly criticises Althusser’s approach. A Post-Marxist philosopher, he 
has published a series of works that raise questions about the identity of the working class and ideology. Notably, 
he has questioned classical representations of the proletariat in his studies on worker emancipation and on the 
nineteenth–century Utopianists, producing a number of works that contributed to his doctoral thesis, published in 
1981 under the title La nuit des prolétaires. Archives du rêve ouvrier.  
He is one of a very small number of philosophers to focus on the question of pedagogy, writing Le maître 
ignorant, published in the mid-1980s, which centres on the figure of the pedagogue Joseph Jacotot. From that 
work onwards, a common thread in Rancière’s analysis is the issue of the status of the intellectual and the expert. 
More recently, he has moved on to exploring the links between aesthetics and politics in essays such as Politique 
de la littérature and le Partage du sensible.  
Running through the wide range of topics he has worked on, one defining element shapes his thinking: the idea 
of emancipation. Indeed, his major works (La nuit des prolétaires, Aux bords du politique, Les noms de l’histoire, 
La mésentente, etc.) set out to bring down and to reframe ideological and social assumptions and to rethink the 
issue of democracy. Rancière never really prescribes exactly what must be done or how it can be done. Rather, 
he attempts to imagine ‘the map of what is thinkable’, of what is perceivable and, starting from the feasible, to 
expand the limits of what social structures define as possible.  
 
 
2.1 The radicalism of the principle of equality and the absence of an ‘enlightened elite’  
 
Far from adopting the stance of the enlightened intellectual who “teaches” the masses to be aware of 
their own domination, Rancière instead formulates the postulate of equality forcefully and then proceeds 
to attack the hierarchy of intelligences.  
 
Against reproducing the power of experts  
One of the most original ideas in Rancière’s works is his radical premise of equality between beings. 
Our starting point, he warns, should not be inequality but equality. In fact, the only way to achieve 
equality in a given society is to assert it, to place it there in order to force its realisation. This equality is 
not a goal to reach; it is a supposition to actualise. This fundamental reversal of what Rancière calls 
‘egalitarian syllogism’ (2006: 509) is a major contribution of his work: he states equality as a founding 
premise and never sees it as programmatic (Badiou, 2006: 143). Within a society revolving around an 
unequal ordering, it is a matter of bringing into play another kind of logic between individuals. This logic 
is, however, not utopian but inherent, because, for inequality to work, the inferior must first understand 
her superior and therefore some sort of equality must be assumed.  
Very much at the opposite extreme of the thinking of, say, Pierre Bourdieu who denounces the scandal 
of  ‘dispossession’  and  begins  with  the  premise  of  fundamental  social  inequality  between  beings, 
Rancière rails against the idea that individuals’ potentialities are determined by their position and that 
individuals are assigned to certain places and to certain roles. Whereas Bourdieu maintains that the 
intellectual should lift the veil on the structure of the established order and bring to light relationships of 
domination, Rancière, in contrast, refuses to presume the imbecility of subjects. Breaking with his 	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
former mentor in La leçon d’Althusser (1974), Rancière contends that no vanguard of the proletariat 
exists that is apt to enlighten the masses.   
His critique is levelled at all who emphasise the voluntary servitude of the dominated, who explain to 
people that they are alienated and that they do not know what is oppressing them, and who state that 
specialists are needed to ‘access the meaning of experience’. According to this line of reasoning, 
because the dominated do not have access to language—and notably, to the language of politics—they 
need experts, scholars, intellectuals, and an ‘endless process of mediation’ (Rancière, 2006: 516) to 
serve their interests. Yet, for Rancière, what the dominated lack is not that their exploitation be revealed 
to them so much as ‘a vision of themselves as beings who can experience something other than this 
destiny as the exploited’.  
Although Rancière by no means denies the heavy burden of social inequalities, he considers that 
recognising these inequalities does not equate to progress and does not actually lead us forward.  
Any conception grounded in the postulate that knowledge may be a means of reaching equality, that 
emancipation can be achieved through theory, thereby setting out a place for equality as a distant 
political ideal in the future, pushes equality away to an unreachable horizon. It turns the figure of the 
‘scholar’, the ‘expert’ or the ‘master’ into a true impostor. As Rancière points out (2007), the theory that 
knowledge is necessary for emancipation is also the theory that eternally postpones emancipation. A 
traditional  argument  in  critical  sociology  states  that  knowing  the  system  of  subservience  is  a  pre-
requisite to achieving liberation. Yet, for Rancière, you are not subservient because you do not know the 
mechanisms of subservience. After all, knowing a situation may also be one way of taking part in it. On 
the contrary, the possibility of emancipation arises from the fact of not knowing the sort of requirement 
that would otherwise compel you to stay in your place.  
 
Attacking the hierarchy of intelligences 
To bring down domination, the basic belief in the hierarchy of intelligences must be assailed and 
equality declared. This is the leitmotiv that runs through Rancière’s work. The ordering of intelligences is 
neither self-evident nor should it be taken for granted. ‘Our problem is not to prove that all intelligences 
are equal. It is to see what we can do on the basis of this presupposition’ (Rancière, 1987: 78-79).  
The pedagogical experience that Rancière recounts as an experiment in Le maître ignorant (1987) 
forms an empirical cornerstone of his thesis. Le maître ignorant is the story of the endeavours in 1818 of 
Joseph Jacotot, a French schoolmaster and revolutionary émigré living in Holland. His task was to teach 
pupils who did not speak his language, so he gave them a bilingual edition of Fenelon’s Télémaque 
(1699). After some time, he asked them to express in French what they thought of what they had read. 
At first, he was not very optimistic about their ability to recount the text, but in the end he was very 
surprised by the quality of their work. His method, consisting of learning a section of the text in French 
with an eye on the Dutch text, proved to be highly successful. The pupils did not need an explanation, 
nor did they need a schoolmaster to guide them. They had learned on their own how to combine words 
in order to build sentences in French. By proceeding by association with what we know we don’t know, 
as when we learn our mother tongue, the use of explanation is no longer needed, asserts Rancière. No 
doubt the schoolmaster fulfilled a function other than transmitting knowledge; no doubt, as Rancière 
underlines (1987), the schoolmaster was master of the classroom ‘due to his command imprisoning his 
pupils inside a circle from which they could only escape by removing his intelligence in order to let their 
own intelligence engage with that of the book’. What the schoolmaster did accomplish was to reveal to 
his pupils their own intelligence2. For them, it was not a matter of moving from ignorance to science, but 
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2 This approach, Rancière points out, has nothing in common with Socratic maieutics. What Jacotot was driving at was to 
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of moving from something they already knew and already possessed to new knowledge, to acquiring 
something new. The ‘ignorant schoolmaster’ is therefore ignorant of inequality, he ‘who does not want to 
know anything of the reasons for inequality’ (Rancière, 2009a).  
The aim of ‘normal’ pedagogy is for the pupil to learn what the master teaches her. However, the 
position  traditionally  granted  to  the  teacher  stems  not  from  necessity  but  from  a  social  hierarchy. 
Jacotot—and through him, Rancière—argues that the logic of the explanatory system must be reversed. 
The reason: ‘the explanation is the myth of pedagogy, the parabola of a world split into knowing minds 
and unknowing minds, mature and immature minds, able and unable, intelligent and stupid’ (Rancière, 
1987). With explanation is associated inequality, a defining principle of regression. Moreover, it is the 
‘explainer’ that makes the ‘unable’ unable. He pulls down the veil of ignorance that he himself then lifts 
(Rancière, 1987), which equates to dividing intelligence in two: a superior intelligence and an inferior 
intelligence. Yet explanation is not indispensible to tackle an inability to understand.  
In Jacotot’s view, equality arises from will power. An individual can learn on her own, driven by her own 
desire or by the constraints of a situation; and, in so doing, she can break away from the logic of the 
subordination of one intelligence to another. Intelligence therefore works autonomously and, states 
Rancière,  it  moves  from  knowledge  to  knowledge,  not  from  ignorance  to  knowledge.  In  contrast, 
imbecility stems from an individual’s belief in the inferiority of her intelligence. ‘To unite humankind, 
there  is  no  better  link  than  this  intelligence  which  is  identical  in  all  beings’  (Rancière,  1987).  All 
intellectual  operations  follow  the  same  course.  Any  intelligence  moves  along  this  path  from  any 
particular starting point. Wherever ignorance is traditionally claimed to be, some knowledge can always 
be found. Yet the social world remains obsessed by a passion for inequality, where individuals never 
stop comparing themselves with others and where conventions separate human beings into hierarchies.  
Emancipation refers back to the interplay of practices guided by the postulate of equality between 
anyone and anyone else and by a drive to constantly verify this equality (Rancière, 1998). The road to 
liberty,  adds  Rancière,  involves  trusting  in  the  intellectual  ability  of  every  human  being,  because 
emancipation  means  learning  to  be  equals  in  an  unequal  society.  Accordingly,  Rancière  (2009a) 
constantly comes back to ‘the power of those who are supposed incompetents and of those who are 
meant not to know’.  
 
2.2 Making space for dissensus 
 
The Rancièrian conception of emancipation equally rests on the central notion of dissensus—at the very 
heart of repoliticising social space.  
 
Breaking the illusion of consensus 
Rancière’s philosophy neither accepts any posture of authority nor any overbearing thinking. But nor 
does  it  validate  consensual  conceptions  of  democracy  advanced  by  proponents  of  an  egalitarian 
approach  to  emancipation.  Any  theory  of  communicative  rationality,  in  the  Habermasian  sense, 
assumes a common ground for recognising problems and ways of defining them. Yet for Rancière, what 
makes politics is the very dissymmetry of the positions taken. The scene for everyone’s ability to speak 
out must always be set in a transgressive and conflictual way in opposition to the rules of the game as 
defined by the powers that be which lay down what the common problem is and who is able to talk 
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lessons in such a way that the pupil was confronted with the gaps in his own thinking and he, the master, would then lead the 
pupil to conclude that what he had said was either inconsistant or inadequate. 	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about it (Rancière, 2007). In Aux bords du politique (1998), Rancière differentiates between the police 
as the art of managing communities and politics as the enacting of the egalitarian principle and, thus, as 
emancipation. The police lays out the order, assigns roles and places, and legitimises the ordering of 
existing social space. Politics is consubstantially anarchic. It disrupts the traditional democratic order 
organised around ‘those who are entitled to govern’ because of their birthright or their knowledge. It 
invites into the debate those who do not count, i.e. ‘those who have no part’. The egalitarian postulate 
serves to bring down the separated worlds of the dominant and the dominated, to create ‘polemical 
scenes’ in the very places where the art of the police strives to depoliticise everything, to suppress 
political conflicts, and to neutralise debate. The common world that is built from the repetition of the 
egalitarian postulate is a space where those who are not traditionally authorised to venture begin to 
debate with the other. This space is polemical because it draws out the inherently conflictual character 
of realities perceived as obvious, natural and taken for granted. A case in point is the moment when a 
university can, in the event of organisational change or governmental measures, become the scene of a 
‘new polemical verification of the community, the chance to re-inscribe the egalitarian signifier’. ‘The 
police says: move along now, there is nothing to see. Politics consists in reconfiguring space, what 
there is to be done there, to be seen there, to be named there’ (Rancière, 1998). 
Within such a framework, discussion plays an important role but, contrary to the model of rational 
deliberation, any discussion occurs on the basis of dissymmetry between positions and focuses on 
recognition of what the object of discussion is and what the abilities of the interlocutors are, thereby 
becoming itself the object of controversy (Rancière, 2007). In Rancière’s view, consensus harks back to 
the idea that there is objectivity and univocity of sensible elements. Through consensus, issues are 
identified and objectified, pertain to expert knowledge and to decisions that flow from such knowledge. 
In line with this way of thinking, politics is often falsely viewed as being the art of pacification or seen as 
a lever to ensure concord between citizens. It is understood as a way of erasing dissensions and 
conflicts, without ever considering that this process ‘throws certain human beings over board’ (Ruby, 
2009: 93). Yet, politics occurs precisely and only as long as there is no agreement on the elements of a 
situation.  
 
Repoliticising the public space through conflict 
Consequently, democracy, for Rancière, signifies the community of sharing in both meanings of the 
term: ‘belonging to the same world which can only be said through polemics, assembling which can only 
be said through combat’ (1998: 92). Conversely, the emergence of totalitarianisms is the result of a 
shrinking of the political space. It is associated with the rise of consensus culture, which restricts debate 
to the political elites and to the experts. In Rancière’s view, democracy can only be promoted through 
the development of political discussion and of ‘dissensus’, not through consensus. Politics comes into 
play once imaginations are deployed and the ‘temporality of consensus is interrupted’ (Rancière, 2009b: 
9).  
Accordingly, politics must be understood as a ‘transgression of the rules defined by official political 
oligarchies’, a struggle between perceptive worlds, a combat between the world of the experts, who 
naturalise the elements of an issue, and the world of ‘those who have no part’, who must fight to define 
what should be the object of discussion. Thus, politics is conflict insofar as there is disagreement on the 
very elements of the situation and on the subjects deemed fit to designate them. It divides rather than 
unifies. This is precisely what Rancière calls ‘dissensus’ (1995: 12), this ‘conflict between one who says 
white and another who says white but doesn’t mean the same thing or who doesn’t understand that the 
other is saying the same thing by using the word whiteness’. Emancipation thereby refers to ‘an activity 
that goes beyond the logic of management or of common meaning fictively stated as being present’ 
(Ruby, 2009: 51). The various social movements that come together to fight against the dismantling of 
the old systems of welfare or to confront international economic institutions share one thing in common: 	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they profoundly question consensual dogma. ‘There is politics only in interruption, the first twisting that 
institutes politics as the deployment of a wrong or of a fundamental conflict’ (Rancière, 1995: 33). 
 
 
2.3 Sharing a common world 
 
Reconfiguring the share of the sensible 
In his works, Rancière relentlessly reasserts that where there is equality, it must be verified by practice 
and by acts that we do ourselves, understood to be systems of reasons. We do not ask for equality from 
another, nor do we exert particular pressure; rather, we give ourselves proof of our equality (Rancière, 
1998). If emancipation is the way out for a minority, then ‘no one leaves the social minority but on his 
own  accord’  (Rancière,  1998:  90).  Accordingly,  emancipating  oneself  does  not  mean  engaging  in 
disruptions but playing in a common space with one’s adversary. Although we are often told to know our 
place and stay there, emancipation involves speaking out and maximising all that is given of liberty and 
equality,  stresses  Rancière.  Becoming  a  political  subject  means  speaking  out  when  you  are  not 
supposed  to  speak,  it  means  taking  part  in  what  you  normally  have  no  part  in.  Democracy—this 
‘government of anyone’ (Rancière, 1995)—is thought of as the paradoxical power of those who are not 
entitled to exercise power. Rancière (2009a) redefines a ‘territory of shared thinking’ in which the 
frontiers that outline identities are moved and transgressed. Such transgression consists in ‘putting your 
feet or shifting your gaze into places other than those supposed to be your own’ and in raising the 
question of sharing the sensible.  
The sensible refers to the ‘system of sensible evidences that allows us to see at the same time the 
existence of something common and the cutting up that defines the respective places and the parts 
therein’ (Rancière, 2000: 12). It is the way, in a given space, that we order the perception of our world 
and how we tie one sensible experience to intelligible modes of interpretation. Acting on the lines of 
sharing between those who are supposedly competent and those who are not equates to questioning 
the existing order and to rising up against the status quo and domination. Political action therefore splits 
open a sensible configuration and places at its heart the concept of human beings acting (Rancière, 
1998: 16) which is embodied in interruption and reconfigures the share of the sensible (Ruby, 2009: 21-
22). This idea is notably embodied in the realm of art and aesthetics. For instance, in the world of 
workers and popular culture characterised by the predominance of oral communication, entering into a 
world of writing—and, in particular, of poetic writing—constitutes genuine emancipation because it goes 
beyond  the  world  of  popular  culture.  This  emancipation  is,  then,  the  reconfiguration  of  territories, 
bringing down the evidence of the visible and drawing up a new topography of the possible. 
This is what is emphasised in the emblematic scene of the Plebeian secession on the Aventine to which 
Rancière often refers (2009a: 176):  
“The patricians do not hear the plebes speak. They do not hear that it is articulated language 
that comes out of their mouths. The plebes must not only argue their case but also set the 
stage on which their arguments are audible, on which they are visible as speaking subjects, 
referring to a common world of objects that the patricians are required to see and to recognise 
as encompassing both parties”.  
Characteristic of the plebes’ speeches is a ‘hidden endeavour to re-appropriate institutions, practices 
and words’ (Rancière, 1976). It is, then, a question of transforming the map of what is conceivable, 
sayable, and realisable by stepping out of the places we are assigned to in order to make ourselves 
seen  and  heard.  Examples  that  Rancière  provides  in  his  works  are  numerous.  There  are  the 
proletarians who take time out from work to read and there is Joseph Jacotot, the pedagogue who 	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reconfigures the teacher/pupil relationship. Their endeavours sought to gain ground in areas forbidden 
to them in their times and their efforts were certainly neither minor nor banal nor insignificant. Such acts 
transformed them into genuinely political subjects.  
 
Singularising the universal 
Police  and  politics  come  into  confrontation  when  politics  disturbs  the  police  system  by  fabricating 
political subjects with a view to universalising a conflict (Ruby, 2009). This is what Rancière calls the 
singularisation of the universal, i.e. individuals’ ability to ‘construct cases’ and to move away from pre-
established social identifications. If the police ordering is a ‘privatisation of the universal’, then politics 
de-privatises the universal by re-enacting it in the form of a singularisation (Rancière, 2006). Neither 
politics nor political theory exist in a broad sense; rather, there are circumstances and contingencies 
that each time force us to discern politics, to spot the places and the times when it intervenes, the 
objects that arise from its action, and the subjects that take part in it (Rancière, 2009b: 14). In this 
sense, the space that Rancière invites us to occupy is not the space for institutionalising practices that 
carry forth the ideal of emancipation. Here, his thinking stands in contrast to that of the pedagogue 
Paolo Freire, an oft-cited reference in the field of CMS, on two related points.  
The first line of demarcation relates to the conditions for thinking about emancipation on the collective 
(or general) plain. For Rancière, emancipation is an eminently individual process that can have nothing 
in common with the collective order. What makes emancipation political is not its own anchoring in the 
collective but the subject’s ability to universalise the construction of her own singular case. In this sense, 
social emancipation is firstly a modification of abilities and behaviours (the singular) and not a finite 
horizon to reach (the universal). It is not the historical ends that create the dynamics of thought and 
action but rather, it is these dynamics (individual and singular) that create the ends (political, universal) 
by disrupting the map of what is given, what is thinkable and, thus, what is imaginable as the goal of a 
given strategy (Rancière, 2007). On this point, Rancière is particularly subtle in the way he conveys the 
quest for the universal advanced by proponents of macro-emancipation and portrays the invention of 
novel practices by situated individuals in contact with particular circumstances and contingencies.  
The second line of demarcation is the conception of the institution. In Rancière’s thinking, no institution 
is  in  and  of  itself  emancipatory.  In  contrast,  Freire’s  thinking  is  fundamentally  a  reflexion  on 
institutionalised education designed to order a progressive society. He does not think of emancipation 
as having the potential to interrupt the harmony of a social order.  
Reasoning in terms of institutions and institutionalisation refers back to a configuration of the order and 
pertains to the way that sharing is ordered, to the drawing of frontiers between those beings who have a 
part in power and others who have no part in it (Ruby, 2009).  
Of  course,  not  all  forms  of  this  ‘police’,  constituted  by  institutions,  are  equivalent,  and  some 
configurations are more desirable that others if they enable the meeting and confrontation between 
‘political logic’ and ‘police logic’ (Rancière, 2009c).  
To wit, this spatial rather than process-oriented conception of emancipation, compelling us perpetually 
to reconstruct new spaces suitable to embrace conflict, sits well with the combat spearheaded by CMS 
against  the  hegemony  of  simplification,  conceptual  enclosure  and  locking  down  within  expert 
knowledge. It does, however, require us to portray this combat more openly as a fight against the 
privatisation of the space for constructing and accessing such knowledge. In this respect, expanding the 
field  for  constructing  management  knowledge  and  for  teaching  it  to  other  stakeholders,  for  other 
recipients, to serve other purposes, seems in our view one way of actualising the principle of equality. 
Turning management into a political space means opening up the possibility to those currently excluded 
from it of taking part in the debate and of contributing to the dissensus that will result from their claims to 
take part in it. The call from several critical scholars for a more polyphonic conception of organisations 	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(Clegg et al., 2006) and of the pedagogical space in management (Ramsey, 2008) may thereby find, in 
the light of Jacques Rancière’s thinking, new and novel forms of expression. 
 
 
3- Implications for Studying Emancipation in Organization Studies 
 
 
By  dismissing  the  two  alternatives  of  macro- a n d  m i c r o -emancipation  embraced  in  CMS,  Jacques 
Rancière’s thinking offers rich and stimulating material for us to rethink the issue of emancipation and to 
reassess the practices of the CMS community. Rancière’s work enables us to put forward several ideas 
outlining the shape that conveying the political project of critical management theories might take (see 
Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Beyond micro- and macro-emancipation: a Rancièrian reading of emancipation. 
Main critiques with respect to:   Rancièrian conception of emancipation 
The goal of emancipation 
- Ideal to reach, always situated in the future  
 
- Postulate of equality to actualise  
Macro-emancipation 
- An elitist and overbearing view  
 
- Postulate of equality and absence of a hierarchy 
of intelligences  
Micro-emancipation 
- Insignificance and banality 
- Collaboration 




- Singularisation of the universal 
 
3.1  Beyond  macro-emancipation  and  beyond  the  expert/non-expert  dualism:  Rethinking  the 
position of the CMS researcher 
 
Firstly, emancipation as Rancière imagines it, should not be seen as an ideal to be reached, but as a 
postulate  to  be  actualised  in  day-to-day  practice.  It  also  means  beginning  with  the  idea  that  any 
individual is able to resist, and actually resists, domination in everyday practice. In this sense, rather 
than making a claim to equality, it is a matter of asserting it from the outset. This is why resistance is not 
a way to reach a future macro-emancipation; it is in and of itself the very definition of emancipation.  
Furthermore,  Rancière’s  argument  echoes  the  voices  of  others  who  seek  to  bring  down  ‘macro-
emancipation’ by stigmatising the elitist and overbearing posture of the intellectual critic. For example, 
Edward  Wray-Bliss  (2003)  suggests  that  eminent  scholars  in  CMS  often  construct  researcher  and 
researched as independent rather than interdependent ‘with the researcher critiquing and commenting 
upon,  rather  than  co-constructing  and  contributing  to  the  lives  of  the  researched’.  He  particularly 
highlights the effects of such authorization of the expert academic and subordination of the researched 
(Wray-Bliss, 2003: 308). This conception, he says, reifies the researched as victims-passive in the face 	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of the all-powerful researcher. Building on Foucault, Wray-Bliss enjoins us to reflect on how CMS 
constitutes this tacit superiority of the researcher and the subordinate status of the researched as 
‘ongoing  subjugations’  in  the  process  of  research.  At  the  heart  of  these  questions  we  find  the 
fundamental issue of the critical researcher’s status as an authority of power and knowledge in the 
emancipation of the dominated.  
It  thereby  compels  us  to  reframe  the  debate  raised  in  the  field  of  CMS  regarding  the  posture  of 
authority. In this fight, the crux of the problem lies in the inability to produce emancipation when starting 
out from a posture that assumes that there are inequalities and that knowledge is indeed capable of 
fighting them. It also echoes Wray-Bliss’ conception (2003: 318) when he argues that CMS constructs 
management as an oppressive force in organizations and tends to construct employees as being aware 
of this fact, yet unable to resist it fully or effectively. This construction, he adds, reinforces the authority 
of academics who can position themselves as knowing better than the workers what form of resistance 
is or is not effective.  
Rancière’s response to this problem has the unique feature of placing the postulate of equality between 
beings  at  the  centre  of  analysis.  Therefore,  emancipation  does  not  imply  ‘a  change  in  terms  of 
knowledge, but in terms of the position of bodies’ (Rancière, 2007). Here, it is the principle of equality 
that must be the starting point for thinking emancipation in organization studies and for acting. The 
scientific assumption that it is the intellectual’s mission to ‘demystify’ and to provide the dominated with 
real explanations for why they are dominated must therefore be rejected. It is not so much a question, 
as Thomas (1998) suggests, of providing ‘discursive resources’ and communicative competences to 
those who do not possess them. For politics—and therefore emancipation, according to the Rancièrian 
conception—is the rejection of the idea that one must have a specific competence in order to take part 
in the debate. Contrary to the overbearing posture of the scholar who is there to uncover domination, we 
argue that the dominated are endowed with reflexivity, intentionality and reason, all of which enable 
them to become aware of their exploitation (Rancière, 1998). To assert the expert’s power would be to 
amplify the asymmetry between actors who are viewed as alienated and ignorant, and a researcher who 
is able to emancipate. Yet, no knowledge and no institution can ultimately ensure this endless task of 
reducing inequalities (Greco, 2007).  
 
3.2 Beyond micro-emancipation 
 
‘Interrupting’ to fight against banality and fleeting forms of freedom 
In the Rancièrian conception, the political subject is the one whose ‘words break in, because they are 
the words of those who are not supposed to speak out’ (Rancière, 2009a: 113). Politics occurs through 
this act of interrupting an established social place (Ruby, 2009: 7). In this sense, every social movement 
seeks a place in the common space and fights to break through the frontier, to redraw the line of sharing 
between authorised voices and unauthorised voices. 
We may reinterpret the critical works of Knights and Morgan (1991) in light of this posture. These 
scholars note how often places are allocated in management and how often roles are assigned through 
discursive devices that establish the social order and naturalise it by neutralising any divergences of 
interest. For instance, they highlight how strategic discourse constitutes the very problem it claims to set 
out to resolve, but equally how this self same discourse creates the strategic subject by constructing the 
subjectivity of actors. These scholars thereby show that strategic discourse often consists in defining 
what the organization’s ‘true’ problems are, in setting the parameters of the solutions designed to solve 
these problems, and in identifying the actors deemed suitable to take part in the decision-making 
process. The discourse develops and reproduces itself through the constitution and application of expert 
knowledge that defines both what the problem is and what its strategic solution is.  	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It is in this terrain that Rancière’s thinking allows us to make some programmatic proposals that have 
meaning with respect to the issue of emancipation. He invites us to imagine possible reconfigurations of 
the field of management that would result in interruption of its order through the irruption of claims to 
equality by those who are not usually counted. This conception may allow to ‘bring onto the scene’ 
those actors who are traditionally forgotten, ‘those who have no part’, subjects—such as workers, 
middle  managers,  consumers,  and  social  movements—surplus  to  the  organization’s  list  of  usual 
stakeholders. Or, to put it in words that echo Rancière’s, to ‘bring them out of the minority’. This means 
rejecting the privatisation of managerial thinking as the province of authorised experts and fostering a 
more  polyphonic  vision  of  organizations  in  order  to  better  understand  their  diversity  and  the 
opportunities they offer for greater openness and change. It falls to us to tear down the frontiers that 
define territories and power, to conceive of spaces where shifts can occur, thereby modifying the map of 
what is thinkable, what is nameable and perceivable, and therefore also what is possible (Rancière, 
2007). This allows us to see how emancipation involves the transformation of the sensible and implies 
reframing the issue so as to leave behind the taken-for-granted nature of the exercise of government 
and of the share of places and powers within organizations.  
The Rancièrian conception also reorients our studies to how emancipation movements seek to change 
the world. It enables us to register the kinds of emancipation movements that have frequently been left 
out of accounts of emancipation in organization studies. These various emancipatory movements are 
often collective but not institutionalized. They include acts of interruption of the social order that takes 
the form of social movements, which question, contest and transgress the established institutions. They 
also include acts of re-appropriation, as the resistance against management in the workplace or in civil 
society illustrates (Spicer and Böhm, 2007). It can consist in re-appropriating ‘critical goods which the 
labour process systematically takes from the worker, such as time, work, products and their sense of 
self’  (Ackroyd  and  Thompson,  1999).  This  involves  struggles  in  everyday  life  through  the  re-
appropriating of identities and daily rhythms that challenge existing patterns of legitimacy or develop 
new ones (Spicer and Böhm, 2007).  
 
Dissensus to move beyond the police  
The political ideal in some streams of CMS (e.g. Johansson and Lindhult, 2008; Reynolds, 1999), firmly 
anchored in the tradition of Habermasian thinking, makes dialogue seeking and consensus-building 
preconditions  to  establishing  democracy.  Research  on  forms  of  deliberative  governance  and  their 
capacity  to  foster  sustainable  organizational  behaviours  (Benn  and  Dunphy,  2005)  and  case-study 
analysis of so-called Open Source communities (O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007) and of collaborative 
groups (Adler and Hecksher, 2006) highlight the importance of the quest for consensus for the joint 
exercise  of  authority  in  organizations.  This  conception  stands  in  radical  opposition  to  Jacques 
Rancière’s own definition of politics, which views dissensus as the main expression of democracy. The 
polemical space that Rancière invites us to construct relates at the same time to the objects that are 
there to be seen and to be taken into account in managerial situations, and to the subjects capable of 
taking hold of these objects, of speaking of them, of constructing an argument and of acting accordingly. 
The dissensus that Rancière advocates stems from the fact that data are never univocal and that there 
is always debate surrounding the very elements that constitute a problem.  
Turning management into a scene of political debate implies moving away from the conception of the 
dominant  democratic  model  grounded  in  building  a  space  for  integration  and  in  searching  for 
consensual agreement (Todd and Säfström, 2008). It implies rejecting all forms—and the very idea 
itself—of collaborating with managers. It also invites us to reassess those egalitarian assumptions in 
favour of which proponents of a pragmatic orientation towards emancipation argue, and means our 
moving  closer  to  actors  and  listening  to  their  particular  problems.  Although  ‘the  other’  (student, 
manager, practitioner) may not be in a position of inferiority (or superiority), this is not the issue here. 	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There is a dissymmetry of positions that must not be accommodated but, rather, debated, whereby 
dissensus should be instructed. Indeed, for Rancière, the logic of consensus seeks to boil down to one 
and the same logic the act of the scholar who knows, of the teacher who teaches, and of the citizen who 
works for equality. And yet, the philosopher tells us, there is no necessary link between these three 
dimensions: surplus to the requirements of any particular knowledge or social purpose, equality always 
remains a postulate to actualise. To preserve its radicalism and its actuality, we must learn, says 
Rancière, to separate functions. An emancipating act is a polemical act, an act that takes into account 
the absolute separation between what the academic does and what the practitioner does 
 
Singularisation of the universal to move beyond fragmented resistance 
Finally, Rancière allows us to move beyond the idea that resistance is forever condemned to being 
localised  and  fragmented.  He  invites  us  instead  to  examine  in  emancipatory  movements—always 
contingent, specific and spontaneous as they are—the expression of their universality. His conception of 
emancipation encourages us to shift our focus onto the moments when and the ways in which all forms 
of  struggles,  action  and  intervention,  both  individual  and  collective,  construct  a  ‘political  scene  for 
dissensus’. This political scene is constructed from the moment the universal principle of equality is 
asserted and a space opens up for the reconfiguration of the sharing of the sensible. The principle of 
equality and the effects of actualising it are thus elements of a universality—at least theoretical, if not 
empirical—that separates political subjects from their local and community-based claims, whether they 
be ethnic, social, religious or sexual in nature. The construction of political subjectivation arises from 
demonstrations of capability and encounters several forms of exclusion and denial. Political work always 
involves dis-identification and can be viewed as a disruption of the system of social identifications.  
In the field of organization studies, this Rancièrian conception of emancipation provides us with a key to 
unlock an interesting reading of various feminist works on management. For instance, it allows us to 
suggest a reinterpretation of the weakness of the political project carried forward by the women-in-
management stream of research, so influential in organization theory. Calás and Smircich voice criticism 
of this movement in the following way:  
‘We  argue  that  there  is,  in  fact,  a  close  relationship  between  feminine-in-management  and 
‘globalization’. If approached separately, each of these managerial discourses appears to bring 
about fundamental changes in corporate America. However, when taken together, one — the 
feminine-in-management — maintains the domestic balance of power that allows for the other — 
globalization— to fight for continuing that same balance in the international arena.’ (Calás and 
Smircich, 1993: 72)  
This feminist conception starts from a principle of inequality between man and woman that must be 
reduced, if not eliminated, without ever calling into question the issue of identity (man/woman) in which 
this inequality is grounded. This feminist posture, and the polemical cases it brings to light, can be 
understood to be a claim to and a fight for material goals and specific rights, but not the construction of 
a political scene. For Rancière, speaking out politically means setting out a capability to decide on what 
is common, and is not simply a claim to exercise a right. It also involves a reinterpretation of one’s own 
position within a social or organizational space.  
In  contrast,  this  Rancièrien  interpretation  invites  us  to  read  into  some,  more  marginal  feminist 
movements in management an attempt to construct such a political scene through a work of dis-
identification that the distinction between gender and sex introduces. This then becomes an attempt to 
singularise the universal that may been viewed as relating to the epistemological stance that Calás and 
Smircich advocate:  
‘We are not intending to suggest ways of organizing or managing from feminist perspectives. 
Rather, our intent is to foster feminist theories as conceptual lenses to enact a more relevant 	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‘organization studies’; an organization studies which will bring ‘into the picture’ the concerns of 
many others, not only women, who are often made invisible in / through organizational processes’ 
(Calás and Smircich, 2006: 286).  
Ascribing  feminist  research  in  management  to  this  rationale  assumes  that  we  consider  how  this 
assertion of equality reconfigures the space of the sensible, that we spot the places and the times when 
it intervenes, the objects that arise from its action, and the subjects that take part in it (Rancière, 2009b: 
14).  
By  stating  the  principle  of  equality  and  its  effects  as  the  universality  of  singular  and  contingent 
processes of emancipation we open up another dimension to the creative potential of some phenomena 
of micro-resistance analysed in the field of organization studies. For example, in their empirical study on 
micro-politics of resistance in the UK Public Services Thomas and Davies (2005) conclude their work as 
follows:  
“[…] by emphasizing the micro-level of experience, we offer a ‘broad-based political resistance’ 
(Hekman,  1990:  186),  focusing  on  struggle  and  tension  and  on  the  everyday  forms  of 
maintenance and control, without recourse to meta-narratives of emancipation. […] The effects of 
such resistance are low levels of disturbance, leading to the destabilizing, weakening and greater 
incoherence of dominant discourses, such as NPM, and in turn creating greater looseness and 
opportunity  to  exploit  spaces.  It  is  these  spaces  that  enable  the  construction  of  alternative 
identities and meanings within forms of domination […] We question the need for a utopian 
narrative of emancipation, valuing the small pockets of resistance that sound a liberatory note 
(Bartky, 1988) and make a difference to how people live their lives and live with themselves.” 
(2005: 701). 
Although it is indeed on the moments and places where these new spaces are created that Rancière 
invites  us  to  home  in,  he  nonetheless  shows  the  universal  character  that  may  reside  in  them. 
Furthermore, he calls on us to defy the idea of resistance that reduces down the egalitarian assertion to 
a simple reaction to a system of domination (Rancière, 2009b: 167). For Rancière, speaking in terms of 
resistance in itself sets the system of domination we are resisting as the norm according to which our 
common affairs operate. It also means such a stance, which is fundamentally defeatist, takes on a 
connotation  of  heroism.  In  Rancière’s  view,  we  should  instead  speak  in  terms  of  assertion,  of 
‘affirmation’. In this sense, resisting means ‘asserting the power of equality in every place where it is in 
fact confronted with inequality’ (Rancière, 2009b: 168). 
 
Jacques Rancière willingly acknowledges that these moments of emancipation are few and far between 
and that the ‘police-politics’ configurations seen in recent years only really provide us with examples of 
forms of partial subjectivation that encounter real difficulties in becoming forms of strong, broad-based 
subjectivation. And yet this does not prevent politics from manifesting itself in a whole range of actions 
(Rancière,  2009b:  182).  Bringing  to  light  the  ways  in  which  these  forms  of  universalization  are 
constituted and engaging in those forms of subjectivation that break all categories wide open, in our 
view,  provide  an  outline  for  a  research  agenda  on  and  for  the  construction  of  an  emancipatory 
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